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LLOYD STEFFEN

The Moral and Spiritual Challenge
of Capital Punishment
In January 1998, Karla Faye Tucker became the second woman
in thirty-one years to be legally executed in the United States. Only a
few weeks ago in Jasper, Texas, a white man, John William King, 24,
was sentenced to death for the brutal and racially-motivated murder of
James Byrd, a black man. On Christmas day, 1998, Pope John Paul II
called for an end to the death penalty, reiterating that call on January
27, 1999 before a crowd of 100,000 at the Trans World Dome in St.
Louis, Missouri: ``I renew the appeal I made most recently at
Christmas for a consensus to end the death penalty, which is both
cruel and unnecessary. Modern society,'' he went on, ``has the means
of protecting itself, without definitively denying criminals the chance to
reform.''
All three of these stories were widely reported. All three stories
pertained to the practice of state-sponsored execution in the United
States. All three stories could provoke some deep questions about the
moral meaning of the death penalty, but I ask, did any of these three
actually do so? My perception is that most Americans believed the
John William King death sentence was a just desert for a horrendous
crime; that Karla Faye Tucker's execution, though more problematic,
was just if the central issue were her actual crime and not how she
reformed; that the Pope's remarks expressed religious ideals that are
not binding in secular America and which are even marginal for many
American Roman Catholics, many of whom are ambivalent about
capital punishment.
In coming to speak with you about the moral and religious
meaning of the death penalty, I want to present what I think are the
critical moral questions involved in each of these three stories. I seek
to demonstrate how we can investigate this topic as a moral
_______________
Lloyd Steffen is University Chaplain and Professor of Religion Studies at
Lehigh University. This talk was delivered at Sacred Heart University on March
15, 1999, as the annual Bishop Walter W. Curtis Lecture.
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issue worthy of our time and effort; and because the death penalty is a
symbol and much of the energy for death penalty support derives from
religious sources and sanctions, I will attend briefly to the role religious
belief can play in providing moral warrants for execution practice.

Moral Issues
Since moral truth is never finally a question of majority
preference, the first thing we must do is avoid appeal to popular
sentiment and polling data as a simple determiner of moral meaning.
Having said that, let me remind you that thirty years ago opinion polls
showed Americans equally divided over the death penalty. That is no
longer the case. Support for capital punishment nationally runs at
around 72%, and there are some counties in Texas, the state that
executes most regularly, where support is over 90%.1 What has led to
this high level of support for capital punishment?
Is it that execution has caused a decrease in murder rates so that a
common good for all of society is advanced? States that have the death
penalty continue to have murder rates twice the rate of those that have
abolished it.
Is it that keeping murderers alive for decades is an extravagantly
expensive and execution provides a necessary economy and cheaper
alternative to incarceration when tax dollars are scarce? Execution
continues to cost from five to six times what a forty-year life sentence
would cost. The state of Indiana recently released an estimate that it
could save five million dollars a year if it rid itself of the death penalty,
savings, incidentally, that might be put into support for the work of law
enforcement officials.2
Is it because the death penalty is one way America can continue to
show solidarity with other societies who share our deepest political
aspirations and cultural values? Every Western democracy except the
United States has abolished the death penalty, and countries that
continue to use it ─ China, Iran, Iraq ─ are regularly cited for human
rights violations. One of the first things South Africa did when
apartheid ended was abolish the harshest instrument of white rule that
was used primarily against blacks, the death penalty.
The death penalty is not an object of fierce and spirited debate in
American society today: it is an accepted practice. If the above reasons,
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which are reasonable reasons for lending the practice support, fail to
justify the practice, why is it so widely accepted? There are two reasons
I will offer.
The first is that many Americans do not trust the criminal justice
system to dispense justice and thus protect innocent citizens from
crime. The average time served for committing a criminal homicide is
less than that spent on drug dealing offenses and the average murderer
is released after only 6½ years.3 In light of that reality, execution begins
to look like a ``final solution'' that assures that an offender who
threatens society will never do so again.
I understand this, but I would remind you that murder is the least
repeated felony crime. Only about 1½% of those who commit
America's 22-23,000 murders per year are sentenced to death. The
claim that our criminal justice system fails to deliver justice is no
argument for justifying the direct, deliberate, and intentional killing of
an individual human person by the state, since a flawed criminal justice
system should be expected to be flawed in capital cases as well.
Supporting execution as a way to compensate for the inadequacies of a
criminal justice system constitutes, in Wittgenstein's language, a
``category mistake.'' Failure of a criminal justice system to deliver
justice and protect the innocent, while a worthy topic for debate and
political involvement, is not an argument for overturning what morality
ordinarily presumes cannot be justified and therefore condemns: the
direct and intentional killing of a member of our moral community.
The second reason why I think so many people support the death
penalty is this: it is justice ─ simple justice, proportional justice, a just
retribution imposing the most serious penalty on the most serious
crime.
What moral assumptions allow us to conclude that the death
penalty is simple justice? I will grant that on first glance it looks that
way, but information and understanding of America's death penalty
system may go far toward dispelling that initial impression; and I really
do believe that because Americans in general do not understand
capital punishment and how it works, we are as citizens oblivious to its
moral challenge. But there is a moral challenge, and I want to present
a case for thinking about that challenge. I will to begin by rehearsing
briefly some of the arguments for capital punishment and show what
would undo them as strong arguments; then I want to try a different
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way of thinking about capital punishment, and ask if you think this is a
better way to think about the subject, a better theory than the others. I
shall outline a theory of what I call ``just execution,'' and it is in that
discussion that we can revisit those three stories with which we began ─
the Karla Faye Tucker execution, the King sentencing, and the recent
papal pronouncements.

Religious Sanction
What are typical defenses of capital punishment? Since lots of
people are guided in their moral thinking by religion, we should at least
mention religious ethics and its attendant moral theory ─ divine
command. Divine command is the theory that provides philosophical
support for acting from religious motives. The foundational question
of ethics is this: Why do you do what you do? In divine command
theory, the answer, which is powerful and in some versions
philosophically defensible, is this: because God told me to.
So here is a first reason to support capital punishment: God
commands it; God even seems to like it. In Western religion, in fact,
of the 613 commandments that comprise the teaching of law in the
Hebrew Bible, 36 of those laws approve of execution for certain
offenses. Before blithely accepting this justification, remember some of
the offenses for which you could be killed besides murder: cursing
your parents, striking your parents (Exodus 21:15); trespassing on
sacred areas (Exodus 19:12); profaning the Sabbath (Numbers 15:32;
would our weekend football and basketball games constitute such a
profanation?); adultery, blasphemy, false prophecy (who would risk
going into meteorology, even with Doppler radar?), and negligence (if,
after being warned that your ox is dangerous, it gores someone to
death, you are to die: think about how many automobile industry
executives would be executed for not getting a recall notice out soon
enough to prevent a death by mechanical fault).
These scriptural references do not represent Jewish teaching, for
the religion of Judaism has strong traditions of opposition to capital
punishment, and in Christianity, the Gospels tell of Jesus interfering to
prevent a legal execution over adultery; of Jesus repudiating the ancient
rule of ``an eye for an eye''; and Jesus asking God to forgive his
executioners, since Jesus obviously thought it was not in his power to
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do so and the offense of execution was ultimately against God.
Many Christians today support capital punishment, but my
argument is that this is because Christian theology has transformed the
cross from a brutal instrument of Roman terror and political
oppression into a sublimated good. Christian theology affirms that the
cross was by divine action rendered the instrument for the atoning
work of the Christ by whose blood God is reconciled to humanity.
The cross as symbol directs our attention not so much to death as to
life and salvation: it became the admittedly harsh but nonetheless
necessary instrument that effects salvation ─ yours, mine, that of the
whole cosmos. With so many positive and life-affirming associations
attached to it, the cross has been rendered in our theological thinking
as a very good thing. A certain reasonable ambivalence thus attaches to
the cross as instrument of state terror, and given that the cross is
transformed into a positive instrument of divine atonement and
acceptable sacrifice, it is no wonder that Christians are not immediately
repulsed at the thought of execution. I continue to imagine, I might
add, that the Jesus whom we are told buckled under the weight of his
cross, did not go to his death secretly joyful that he was about to effect
a cosmic reconciliation between a sinful humanity and a God whose
justice couldn't be reached any other way than by the sacrifice of
innocent blood.4
My immediate point is that religion is a primary sanction for the
death penalty. ``Thou shalt not kill'' means you should not kill unless
the killing can be justified, and any killing that God approves is
automatically justified ─ including for profaning the Sabbath or cursing
your parents. Upon examination it is not so clear what God's will is in
the matter of execution: the one time God directly deals with a
murderer and dispenses justice personally ─ the Genesis story of Cain
─ God refuses to demand of the murderer life for life. What God's will
is on state- or community-authorized execution is an interpretive issue
that undergoes revision in Judaism and Christianity over time.
Although I cannot claim to know for certain God's final view on the
appropriateness of the death penalty, I do find it significant that the
Jesus presented in the Gospels is presented as one who explicitly
repudiated ``eye for an eye' thinking, who nowhere endorses the right
of the state to execute, and who himself was condemned by the state ─
the Roman state ─ to death for the crime of sedition.

Published by DigitalCommons@SHU, 1999

5

Sacred Heart University Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 2

20

LLOYD STEFFEN

Deterrence
But there are other arguments: deterrence, for example.
Execution protects society by setting on crime so high a price that the
thought of being put to death deters you, that is, it prevents you from
committing the crime. A major proponent of this theory, John Stuart
Mill, a nineteenth-century English philosopher, thought that the
foundation of deterrence was psychological arousal. In other words,
the thought of death must be so terrible against the background of
normal life that it presents a horrendous prospect that would
psychologically arouse a susceptible and tempted individual to refrain
from murder.
Deterrence has problems as an argument, since there is no
evidence that those who commit murder in a moment of passion give
any thought to consequences; and those who commit more sinister,
premeditated murder are convinced they'll never get caught. But the
problem I want to pose is this: How in a society like ours do we
provoke psychological arousal and a sense of horror sufficient to
prevent a murder? Is execution really so fearful? Does arousal come
from thinking about the execution, which is now not a boiling in oil or
a hanging followed by being drawn in four directions by horses and
dismembered, then having one's intestines shoveled out of your body
for you to see before dying as molten lead is poured into your
abdominal cavity? That medieval execution method might even work a
little today against the backdrop of the latest slasher film or tonight's
top news story in Philadelphia, which is likely to be a murder. But
routine violence and commonplace murder have desensitized us ─
have they not? ─ robbing us of the capacity for the arousal deterrence
requires?
Consider that murder is not only familiar in our environment: it's
the centerpiece of our entertainment. The average child growing up in
America will by the age of 18 witness in the media 16,000 murders and
over 200,000 acts of violence.5 Against that background of violence,
how do you generate sufficient psychological arousal to create horror
at the thought of execution? How do you generate a deterrence effect
based on horror when we execute people in secret, and then do so by
giving them an IV? Is an IV so scary that it would deter a murderer? Is
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the thought of drifting off to permanent sleep by an IV so horrible a
prospect that it makes us shudder just thinking about it, so much so
that we know for certain that we would not kill another human being
for fear of facing such a terrible death?

Just Retribution
Deterrence is often heard and still appealed to, but there is no
evidence of a deterrent effect, which would be a plausible justification
for capital punishment. How about another argument: just retribution?
For committing a murder, the killer must die. Why? Because, as the
Enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant said, by killing another,
you forfeit your own life on a principle of simple proportionate justice.
Justice requires the execution. What harm you visit on another should,
as a fair and just response, be visited on you as proportionate
punishment: it's the Golden Rule. Kant went so far as to say that by
entering into society and its system of justice administration, while you
wouldn't will your own execution, you, as a citizen possessed of the
right to be treated with respect and protected from interference,
implicitly consent to the forfeiture of your own life as just punishment
for the crime of willfully taking the life of another.
This may sound like a defensible reason, and, as I say, I think this
is one of the reasons people commonly advance to justify the death
penalty. But there are some problems. Kant believed that murderers
must die because justice demands it and that every murder is morally
equivalent to every other murder ─ so that equal and proportionate
justice requires on principle that every murderer be put to death.
There are, as I said, 22,000 murders in America every year, and we
put on death row about 300 people, or about 1½%. Kant's theory
would have us dispense death to 22,000 individuals a year, for if you
take a life you lose your life.
Americans may want more executions, but would we tolerate
22,000 a year? We would have to resort to king-size multiple-use
poisoning gurneys and retire electric chairs and build electric couches.
I am willing to assert, in a hopeful and optimistic frame of mind, that
an around-the-clock, day-in-day-out killing operation that piled up
22,000 corpses a year for a crime where currently the average sentence
is 6½ years would offend Americans' aesthetic, if not moral,
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sensibilities.
But that is not even the biggest problem. The one thing Kant
never seemed to have considered is that the system of justice
administration would execute an innocent person. Kant's moral
philosophy could not justify the execution of an innocent person, and
he went out of his way to argue against the kind of moral thinking that
would allow the death of an innocent person as an acceptable loss. A
wrongful killing would be impossible to justify, for in Kant's
philosophy, to engage in any behavior required that the rule or maxim
governing that behavior be made akin to a universal law. By consenting
to the proposition that ``Executions must proceed even if they
occasionally kill an innocent,'' you would have to agree that the
innocent person ─ even if it were only one ─ could be you, or your
mom or dad, or another loved one. You would have to consent to that
─ it would have to be any innocent person, any individual from the
class of innocent persons; and you, if you support the acceptable loss
theory, could not distinguish one innocent from another. You would
have to consent not only to your own wrongful execution, but that of
those you love.
Kant himself would not agree to this on principle, for on his
theory it would be contradictory to say that killing the innocent is
unjust, which it is (and all reasonable persons know it to be), but that
execution can be morally justified even when it is unjust. Unjust
killings, because they cannot be justified, are morally prohibited. ``But
there are not unjust execution killings because we do not execute
innocent persons,'' you say. You are wrong to say that. Hugo Adam
Bedau, Michael Radelet, and Constance Putnam in their book, In
Spite of Innocence, identify 400 wrongful capital convictions this
century, with 23 of those wrongful capital convictions actually leading
to executions.6
Since the moratorium on executions was lifted in 1976 and
executions resumed under the Constitution, about 80 individuals who
have been convicted of murder and put on death row to await
execution have been released from prison on a finding of innocence
and wrongful conviction. That statistic reveals why we have an appeals
process. Our criminal justice system, for all of its perceived flaws has
one outstanding virtue: it was constructed by individuals who
understood that it would make mistakes, and the mistake that most
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needs avoiding is a mistake around execution. Such a mistake cannot
be righted: it's an irrevocable mistake. If polls in the wake of the first
O.J. Simpson trial are a reliable guide, most people believe that the
criminal justice system makes mistakes. It is thus curious why this
suspicion of a criminal justice system, widely regarded to be
error-prone, does not seem to translate into suspicion about the
dispensing of justice in capital cases. Many Americans, the same ones
who feel victimized by unfairness in their parking tickets or traffic
violations, blithely accept that no such unfairness arises in capital cases.
How can the variable of human fallibility, so prevalent in disputes over
parking tickets, not attach to murder cases?
Weighed against the empirical reality of those wrongfully
convicted and later released from death row upon findings of
innocence is the counterpoint to a view given its clearest expression by
Mary Sue Terry, Attorney General of Virginia from 1986-94, who said
in replying to an appeal to introduce new evidence from a prisoner
sentenced to death: ``Evidence of innocence is irrelevant.''7
The justice administration system makes mistakes. They may be
rare or not so rare, but Kant only needs one execution of an innocent
in practice to create havoc for his theory. If confronted with the
American system of justice administration, I believe Immanuel Kant,
who articulated the theory that justice requires that killers be killed,
and who articulated the simple retributive justice argument that holds
sway for many if not most supporters of the death penalty today, would
not ─ and could not logically ─ support execution as practiced in
America today.

Just Execution
Let us turn away from these old arguments and try something new.
Consider this question: Should the state have the right to kill its own
citizens? Yes or no. Those who say no may be pacifists or speaking out
of a religiously-based absolutism, and I have no persuasive argument to
penetrate the absolutism barrier. So let us take the non-absolutist
option, which yields a positive response to the question. But then this
question comes as a rapid follow-up: Should the right of the state to kill
its own citizens be restricted? ``O yes,'' you say, ``We do not want
the state to claim some power where it can just dispense death
capriciously and at a whim. That would be to approve of Hitler's Nazi
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regime, or Pol Pot or Idi Amin ─ pick your murderous tyrant.'' So then
the answer is that the right of a state to kill its citizens is a restricted
right, the kind of right exercised by police officers when they use lethal
force to defend themselves or to protect innocent citizens in
threatening situations. The state clearly has the right reasonably in such
situations as that, but police cannot just kill people deemed
undesirable. Killing by the state must be restricted to self-defense or to
protect others.
If we are in agreement up to this point let me proceed to ask
about capital punishment. Does the state have a right to kill citizens
through capital punishment? You may say yes, but I want to say,
``Not so fast.'' A police officer who kills in self-defense does so in the
immediacy of the threat. The officer cannot wait until the offender is
captured, rendered defenseless, then walk into the offender's cell and
kill the unarmed, incapacitated offender claiming self-defense.
Self-defense may be a just reason to use deadly force, but the
situation just described hardly warrants a claim of self-defense. Yet that
is the situation facing the capital offender who has been captured,
imprisoned, and rendered non-threatening. The threat is not
immediate, so that the use of lethal force on grounds of self-defense is
no longer appropriate. What if you kill to protect others? Again, if the
offender is removed from society and incapacitated so that no threat is
posed, then society is protected. It would be wrong for a police officer
to use lethal force on an incapacitated offender for the reason that by
so doing, society at large was being protected. The threat is gone.
What I mean to suggest by these statements is that we do grant the
state power to use lethal force, and yes, the state may kill its citizens:
but it is a highly restricted right and if truth be told, we seem to honor
what I would call a moral presumption or general rule ─ a reasonable
rule ─ that ordinarily the state ought not to kill its own citizens. Even
police authorized to use deadly force ought not do so frequently or
without grave cause, such as self-defense. On this logic, I want to say
that the foundation for rethinking the moral challenge of capital
punishment must reside in a common agreement that you and I share,
namely, that whatever our differences on capital punishment, you and
I should be able to agree that the state ought not to kill its citizens. We
agree on this rule, though I acknowledge, as you should, that that rule
or presumption is not absolute. It admits of exceptions, and the
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question is, ``Is capital punishment an allowable exception to our
rule?''
A theory of what I call ``just execution'' is a moral theory that says
that the state ought not, ordinarily, kill its own citizens. By logical
extension, if the state ought ordinarily not kill its citizens, then neither
should it, ordinarily, execute them. A moral presumption against the
use of the state's execution power attaches to the idea that the state
ought not ordinarily kill its citizens, so that we can say without
controversy, even in a society that allows capital punishment, that the
moral presumption at stake in capital punishment is against the use of
the death penalty. If we use this punishment at all, we want to use it
rarely, maybe for only the worst of the worst crimes: we don't want to
use it for jaywalking or traffic violations or robbery or even rape or
assault. We want to restrict it to murder ─ this is a rather recent
development historically ─ and the fact that only 300 out of 22,000
murders a year get to death row indicates just how much we want to
restrict its use. This restricted use of the death penalty is concrete
evidence of a societal belief that ordinarily we ought not to execute
persons, even murderers. It is clear from the American practice of
execution that observing the presumption against the use of capital
punishment is what accounts for the fact that we subject only a few and
then special cases of offenders to capital punishment.
Which cases? This is where things get interesting. In light of the
moral presumption against capital punishment, a theory of just
execution would specify conditions that would have to be satisfied if
the presumption against execution were to be justifiably lifted, and
every time a criminal offender is sentenced to death, we presumably
do that. We say: ``Here is a case where it is just to impose a death
sentence: here is a situation in which we can morally justify lifting the
presumption against the use of the death penalty.''
That is the theory. The theory is one thing, the practice another.
Let me lay out nine conditions that I think would have to be met in
practice if we are to impose a death sentence justly:
1. The punishment must be authorized by competent
authority.
2. There must be a just cause for using it, a grave cause, like
self-defense.
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3. The motivation for using it must be justice and not
vengeance.
4. It must be imposed fairly, without discrimination.
5. The punishment itself must not be cruel, for respect for
persons prohibits torture.
6. The punishment must not subvert the very value (life)
that it is supposed to be protecting and promoting.
7. It must be a last resort: no other punishment could
possibly deliver justice adequately short of execution.
8. The end being sought must restore the equilibrium of
justice upset by the offender's crime: the end must be
the restoration of peace.
9. The punishment must not yield an effect out of
proportion to the end being sought: it should be
proportionately, the worst punishment for the worst
crime.8
If all of these conditions are met, as presumably they are when we
sentence persons to death and execute them, the execution, on this
theory, may be deemed just. The American legal system, in my view,
has appealed to such a moral theory in developing execution policy,
making executions infrequent and not even a regular punishment for
murder. When a death penalty is pursued in a particular case, it is
done so with the sense that the above criteria have been satisfied. The
law restricts use of the death penalty, requires fairness and
non-discrimination in imposition, and establishes various conditions
that must be satisfied in the interests of promoting justice and
evaluating the moral meaning of execution practice.
That is the theory. It is a theory of ``just execution'' that can be
used to test any particular execution, even the whole system of
execution. It is a reasonable theory, and it conforms to a system of
natural law moral thinking originating in Cicero and transmitted to
Western culture through the Roman Catholic moral tradition, where it
has been used to frame a theory of, say, a just war. (In ``just war''
theory, several conditions are laid out that if met would overturn the
just war presumption that we ordinarily ought not to use force to settle
conflicts.)
Our American practice of capital punishment does not meet the
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requirements of the just execution moral theory. For if the conditions
are not met ─ all of them, all nine ─ then an execution cannot claim
moral justification. Although some of the criteria can easily be met in
individual cases, all nine are not ever met in the current practice of
execution.
Fair imposition, for instance, is continually violated. It is violated
on racial, gender, and class grounds. A disproportionate number of
persons sent to death row are black and male, and the racial issue
shows up not so much by looking at the color of death row inmates,
but by looking at the race of victims. A person who kills a white person
in the state of Maryland is 11 times more likely to get a death sentence
than if the victim is black. Why? I suggest racism. The message in that
statistic, which has correlates across the country and reveals a similar
attitude toward execution that was found in South Africa, is this: killing
whites is the crime that overwhelmingly increases the likelihood of a
death sentence. The General Accounting Office has said that in 82%
of cases, race of victim was found to influence who would be charged
with capital murder and eventually receive the death penalty.9
If we as American citizens were educated about how the death
penalty is imposed, we would realize that the truly startling thing about
the conviction of John William King in Texas is that he was a white
person sentenced to death for killing a black person. That fact was
reported in the news as the second time this had happened in Texas,
but unfortunately it did not lead to a wider discussion about the true
locale of racial discrimination in death sentencing: that race of victim is
the deciding factor and the King conviction is noteworthy because it is
a blatant exception to the rule concerning who receives a death
sentence. Executing a white person for killing a black person is an
anomaly in our practice of execution, and despite the fact that this was
reported, we seem to be focused on the just desert delivered to one
filled-with-hate and easy-to despise individual, as if that one case can be
our paradigm of justice. How can we say conclude from one situation
that justice is imposed in capital cases in a non-discriminatory fashion
when the death penalty is a societal practice that requires that we look
at the practice as it is imposed across the society? If you do that, you
will find, as did the General Accounting Office, that racial
considerations affect the entire process of arrest, indictment,
prosecution, jury selection, trial, sentencing, and appeal. The King
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conviction ought to have opened up a wider conversation about the
way in which race affects the death sentencing process, but
unfortunately we let go the fact that this was the second time this has
happened in Texas history and settled our consciences with the belief
that impartial justice was delivered. If we look at the King sentencing
against the historical and social backdrop of execution practice in
Texas, King is a clear anomaly, so much so that as much as I fear
saying this, King seems positioned to make a case logically ─ not legally
─ that since Texas does not execute those who kill black persons, he is
a victim of racial discrimination in sentencing practices. This terrible
irony brings home the reality of racial discrimination in America's
execution practices.
But discrimination affects not only race. About 90% of capital
defendants are indigent, so poor that they cannot afford counsel. They
thus receive court appointed attorneys, who often are not prepared to
engage capital law, which is a highly specialized area of criminal law.
There is a class discrimination surrounding the death penalty, and
some notable murder cases involving wealthy persons ─ O.J. Simpson
and the Dupont trial in Philadelphia ─ testify to the role that well-financed legal defense teams play in keeping capital punishment away
from clients.
And gender is an issue. Of the 532 executions since 1976, only
three of them have involved women. It was a big story when Texas
proceeded to execute Karla Faye Tucker, a woman who was articulate
in interviews, had nice hair and capped teeth, a born-again Christian
who even married the prison chaplain. What made this Texas
execution noteworthy was the fact that Karla Faye Tucker was a
woman, and that is an issue because women are so rarely executed.
Even in Texas there was serious division over this one. Karla Faye
Tucker did not seem threatening. This attractive woman who had been
forced into prostitution as a teenager by her mother found prison the
best environment she had ever known. And in that environment, she
flourished and reformed and died truly different from the drug-crazed
murderer who buried a hatchet in the skull of one of her victims. The
fact is that many of those on death row have stories like Karla Faye
Tucker, and many are born-again Christians, as she was. The special
factor in this case was sex ─ and execution is a gender specific practice,
a ``male thing,'' if you will, that discriminates along gender lines.
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Since 1976, at least 12,000 women in this country have been
convicted of killing their children, with only 3 or 4 of them sentenced
to death, so the problem is not a lack of women candidates for
execution. The point rather is that in a sexist society, it is possible that
women are not viewed as being fully autonomous moral agents who
can be held fully accountable for their murders. I only want to point
out the fact of discrimination: actually, women do not fare well in the
criminal justice system when the crimes are not capital. But where the
death penalty is concerned, there is a sex discrimination affecting the
execution practice, and that is what the Karla Faye Tucker execution
exhibited: the second woman in thirty-seven years out of the more than
500 executions that had taken place in those years. A theory of ``just
execution'' would not allow discrimination on any of these grounds ─
race, class, or gender. That one criterion ─ just imposition ─ prohibits
discrimination and would halt a system of execution infected with
discrimination.
But I mentioned nine criterion, not just one; and these others fail
as well.
In an adversarial system of law, prosecutors will often appeal to
emotion and thus to vengeance to gain a death sentence. Executions
rarely bring peace to those who have lost loved ones, and not every
surviving victim of capital crime wants another death. Executions
continue to be botched, thus cruel. The fact that execution perpetuates
the cycle of violence, leading fools to cheer on an execution rather
than soberly accept the loss of a life as tragic, even when it is a
murderer's life, gravitates against the criterion that execution honors
life and does not subvert the value of life.
Furthermore, let me reiterate that capital punishment cannot be
said to be proportional, if by that we mean that we mete out the most
serious punishment for the most serious crime. We execute for
murder, but the average murderer in the United States not only avoids
the death penalty but serves, as I said, only 6½ years in prison. Drug
offenders on average serve longer sentences. Those facts should force
the conclusion that our most serious crime is not murder but drug
offense, and that conclusion can be drawn logically by looking at how
we put into practice what we value.
What all of these things mean is that the American execution
practice is out of sync with what a theory of just execution would
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demand; and the one criterion that seems to me never to be met is
``last resort.'' If a criminal is removed from society and rendered
non-threatening, and the public is made safe and secure, we thus have
an alternative to execution. This is precisely the point that Pope John
Paul II has been making. In making this point he is not making a vague
appeal to religious ideals but to a criterion of just execution theory. He
is pointing out that a just execution theory will set a standard for justice,
then saying that our execution practice does not satisfy the last resort
criterion. He is thereby pointing to a general moral failure in the
system of state-sponsored execution. The Pope is also offering the view
that there are alternatives to execution that will protect society ─
criminal perpetrators can be incapacitated by incarceration ─ so that
execution is not, in fact, a last resort. I would point out that not only is
last resort challenged by the incarceration alternative mentioned by the
Pope, but American law has evolved recently to prevent jurors from
thinking about incarceration as a reasonable option to execution. In
Pennsylvania, life imprisonment means life without parole in every
instance where life imprisonment is imposed, and that can be a terrible
and harsh fate. The Supreme Court, however, has said that states that
have such a policy do not need to inform jurors that a life sentence
would keep the offender away permanently, a bizarre decision that
seems designed to keep the capital punishment system going by means
of keeping jurors uninformed of their sentencing options. Removing
options or misleading people into thinking they do not have options
whereby legitimate societal safety concerns can be fairly evaluated
violates the spirit of just execution theory, for the theory is all about
making informed choices in a context of freedom. It was only in such a
context of freedom that the Pope could evaluate the execution practice
and determine that the incarceration option suffices to incapacitate
violent offenders, provide for the public safety, and thus challenge the
execution practice itself on the basis of the ``last resort'' criterion of
just execution theory.

Conclusion
I came here to say that the death penalty poses a moral challenge.
The moral challenge of the death penalty concerns the central
question: Can the killing that occurs when a person is executed by the
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state be rendered just, that is, can it be deemed a morally justified
killing? You cannot answer that question without finding out about
how we actually put a theory of just execution into practice, and the
American practice of execution does not meet the test of the theory.
You and I should be able to agree that the best moral defense of
execution killing or any kind of killing is self-defense or defense of the
innocent. But the death penalty is not self-defense, and this is the heart
of the Pope's moral objection to the death penalty. State-sponsored
execution is a deliberate and cold-blooded killing of a defenseless and
powerless individual, who, indeed, may be a terrible human being. The
argument might then go, ``Well, then, it protects society.'' If the
average murderer is incarcerated for only 6½ years, the legitimate fear
of violent criminals being released to kill again is aroused, and it is
reasonable even for capital punishment opponents to say that those
who threaten the public safety must be contained. But making sure that
our criminal justice system delivers justice and incapacitates those who
threaten the public safety provokes issues that ought to issue in a
debate about the effectiveness of our criminal justice system. The fact
that murderers may spend less time in prison than drug offenders is
not itself a moral justification for execution killing.
The problem is that we never seem to get around to talking about
the criminal justice system because public officials have learned that all
they have to do to respond to the crime problem and indicate that they
are ``hard on crime'' is to say ``I support the death penalty'' and thus
dispense with ideas about what they would do to combat crime and
strengthen the environment where all of us want to be secure in our
persons. When I hear public officials responsible for some aspect of
our justice administration system start talking about the importance
and necessity of capital punishment in the state's arsenal of
crime-fighting tools, I assume that they have no ideas, no plan, nothing.
Capital punishment is code, and in its worst symbolic connotations, it
is a code that appeals to our fear of those who in this society present
themselves before the majority as the stranger ─ the poor and the
racial minority.
Execution is not a major cause of death in America, but it is a
major symbol. The question is, of what? It is offered as a symbol of
justice, but I am convinced that a study of the death penalty will reveal
that that is illusion. It is a symbol of power, an ultimate God-like power
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that human beings should be reluctant to grasp lest they act in pretense
as if they were God. The death penalty does not conform to the
requirements of justice and fairness, and the death penalty minus
justice equals power. Exercising this ultimate power ─ this power to
take life ─ in pursuit of a perfect justice that is not only irrevocable but
which mistakenly obliterates the body in punishing the moral
personality oversteps its bounds, offends justice, models a use of
violence for solving societal problems, and, theologically, announces
the death of God.
I conclude by reminding you that spirituality is what you do with
your freedom, so that using your freedom to learn about capital
punishment is the spiritual challenge that faces you. You will become a
more informed citizen by so doing. And if you learn about how
execution policy is put into practice and carried out in your name and
with your consent, you may become a more morally reflective and
critical citizen, more apt to raise a moral questions about an issue that
many will tell you is not really a moral issue at all. ``Of course the
death penalty is justified, morally justified.'' In that ``of course'' is the
moral challenge that faces you.
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